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WHAT YOU'LL LEARN TODAY

This session shares our real-world experience to help your organization prepare for and respond to cyber threats.

- 1 The Initial Disruption**
How we discovered the attack and what those first indications looked like
- 2 Critical Decisions Under Pressure**
Key decisions we made and how we made those decisions and what didn't
- 3 Changing the Way We Work**
How we changed our operations and recovery that other organizations should anticipate
- 4 Path to Full Recovery**
The journey back to normal operations and handling each phase back
- 5 Actionable Lessons**
Specific steps local governments can take to strengthen cyber security posture

THE CALL THAT CHANGED EVERYTHING

Sunday, June 17, 2018 — Early Morning

4:42 AM — Automated monitoring systems detect server failures. The Network Operations Center notifies alert that systems are going offline.

4:44 AM — NOC technician Kevin Davis begins first-level investigation. Remote access attempt fails. Ping verification fails. Something is seriously wrong.

5:03 AM — The scope becomes clear: 2 servers are down, but as investigation continues, the number grows, COADCO 1, COADCO 2, COASQL 01 — critical infrastructure is falling.

5:42 AM — Five servers are now confirmed cryptolocked. Both domain controllers, the database server, application server, and the VMware vCenter — the heart of our IT infrastructure — all encrypted. The word no one wants to hear is **ransomware**.

ATTACK TIMELINE

- 4:42 AM Automated monitoring detects server issues
- 4:44 AM First-level investigation begins - verification failed
- 5:03 AM Severity 1 status declared - 2 servers confirmed down
- 5:42 AM Spread identified - 5 servers now compromised
- 6:09 AM Emergency response notification issued to client
- Morning On-call team mobilized, recovery planning begins

COMPROMISED SERVERS

Five critical servers were cryptolocked — 89% of our total server infrastructure:

COADC01	Primary Domain Controller	Critical
COADC02	Secondary Domain Controller	Critical
COASQL01	Production SQL Database Server	Critical
COAAP01	Application Server	High
COAVCENTER01	VMware vCenter Server	Critical

CRITICAL DECISION #1

Pay the Ransom or Restore from Backups?

Considerations

Paying the Ransom:

- Requires immediate decision
- Funds criminal organizations
- Makes us repeat targets
- FBI strongly discourages

Restoring from Backups:

- Longer recovery time
- Depends on backup integrity
- Some data may be irretrievable
- Must be tested regularly

OUR DECISION

We chose NOT to pay.

Instead, we committed to full recovery from backups, working with our IT partner ISG to rebuild systems properly and identify vulnerabilities.

This decision added recovery time but ensured we were not funding criminal enterprises or encouraging future attacks.

CRITICAL DECISION #2
Full Disclosure or Minimize Public Awareness?

The Dilemma

- Minimize Public Disclosure
 - Avoid public scrutiny
 - Prevent media frenzy
 - Prevent speculation
- Full Transparency
 - Build goodwill
 - Help other municipalities
 - Demonstrate accountability
 - Meet ethical obligations

OUR DECISION

We chose transparency.


Citizens deserved to know about service disruptions and data security. We communicated honestly about the incident, recovery timeline, and steps being taken.


This built trust and positioned us to help other local governments learn from our experience.

CHALLENGES WE FACED


Real obstacles that other municipalities should anticipate

- Wasted Timing**
Allocating resources during a crisis is difficult. *Requires a commitment from day one.*
- Backup Verification**
Not all backups were as current or complete as thought. *Some had to be rebuilt from other versions.*
- Barriers to Resilience Complexity**
COAG (CIT) required complete file-level restoration. *This process is more complex and time-consuming than standard restores.*
- Staff Burnout**
Recovery required 6-10 hours a day for technical staff. *Maintaining the pace with no respite led to fatigue and mistakes.*
- Public Communication**
Balancing technical accuracy without causing panic while managing citizen expectations and inquiries. *Requires a dedicated communication team.*










LESSONS LEARNED: TECHNICAL

- Backup Testing is Non-Negotiable**
 What happened: Medication backup scheduling recovery should have been taught earlier
 Action taken: New test recovery procedures created, not just verify backup completion
- Network Segmentation Matters**
 What happened: Attack spread rapidly because wireless network wasn't properly isolated
 Action taken: Implementation of VLANs and microsegmentation controls between devices
- Vulnerability Patching Can't Wait**
 What happened: 100% of critical device weaknesses did not get patched in 48 hours
 Action taken: Established monthly vulnerability patching window aligned with compliance tracking
- Monitoring = Security**
 What happened: Malicious IP attack could not be identified
 Action taken: Added endpoint detection and response (EDR) for possible threat hunting

LESSONS LEARNED: ORGANIZATIONAL

- Incident Response Plan Must Be Practiced**
 What happened: Our plan fell apart on paper but we improved decision making
 Action taken: New runbook created, scenario identified with key decision makers
- Communication is as Critical as Technology**
 What happened: Internal calls to executives not used during response
 Action taken: Created response document for executive level communication
- Vendor Relationships Need Testing**
 What happened: 100% of critical vendor services had not been tested 30+ days prior
 Action taken: Annual vendor audit for review and escalation path testing
- Staff Need Rotation and Rest**
 What happened: Key personnel burned out, couldn't quickly respond after 48 hours
 Action taken: Established shift rotation and minimum rest requirements in incident plans







IMMEDIATE ACTIONS (0-30 DAYS)

Start here — these require minimal budget and can be done quickly

Test Your Backups	Don't just rely on your backup software. Verify your backups work. Do this quarterly.	Critical
Review Patch Status	Identify all systems. 90-day rollout on security patches. Check for vulnerabilities without fixes.	Critical
Document Your Assets	Create an inventory of all servers, host roles, and third-party devices. You can't protect what you don't know about.	High
Verify Incident Contacts	Who do you call in a 24-hour crisis? Make sure phone numbers are current and people know them.	Critical
Review Insurance Coverage	Check your insurance policy. Make sure you have adequate coverage for data breach and ransomware.	High
Enable MFA Everywhere	Make sure MFA is enabled on all critical systems and user accounts. No exceptions.	Critical

SHORT-TERM IMPROVEMENTS (1-6 MONTHS)

Requires budget approval and planning—start conversations now

Implement Network Segmentation Segment critical systems for general network zone 100% to help reduce the attack surface.	\$5
Deploy Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Deploy EDR on all critical assets and regularly update machine learning to early attack detection.	\$5-\$5
Establish Security Operations Center (SOC) Operate 24x7 (night) or 24x7x5 monitoring with pager on-call coverage as available.	\$5-\$55
Conduct Tabletop Exercise Walk through an incident scenario with stakeholders to identify gaps before they occur.	\$
Implement Security Awareness Training Quarterly training for all employees on passwords and security best practices.	\$

Contact: (510) 510-0000 | 2025-2026





THE REALITY CHECK

You don't need to do everything.




Start with what makes sense for YOUR organization's size, budget, and risk profile.



The goal isn't perfect security — it's being prepared enough that when (not if) an incident occurs, you can respond effectively, recover quickly, and learn from the experience.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

WHEN, NOT IF 	DECISIONS AHEAD PRESSURE PREPARED 	RESTORE IS KEY 
COMMUNICATE EFFECTIVELY 	DON'T PAY 	START SMALL TEMPORARY FUTURE 



CUSTOM DR PLANS OVER TEMPLATES

Template-based DR plans are a common way to create a disaster recovery (DR) plan. However, they often lack the flexibility and specificity needed to address the unique needs of your organization. Custom DR plans, on the other hand, are designed to meet your specific requirements and provide a more comprehensive and actionable recovery strategy.

Feature	Template Approach	Custom DR Plan
Asset Mapping	Generic, one-size-fits-all	Specific, tailored to your unique data
Recovery Point & Recovery Time	Fixed, arbitrary targets	Based on actual business criticality
Scalability	Rigid and difficult to adjust	Built to evolve with your environment
Flexibility	High cost of change	Adapted through specific scenario testing



WE'RE HERE TO HELP

We learned these lessons the hard way so you don't have to.

The cybersecurity community—especially among global governments—is built on sharing expertise and helping each other prepare.

Feel free to reach out if you have questions or need guidance.
